The Amnesty initiative was first officially inaugurated on April 24, 2013, when former President Goodluck Jonathan launched the “Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North” headed by the Special Duties Minister Kabiru Taminu Turaki and other government officials and religious authorities. The Committee was given the task of engaging key leaders of Boko Haram and developing a functional framework for granting amnesty to members of the group.
Five years down the line, the amnesty initiative has once again been resuscitated and as expected, the cart was placed before the house. The first task of attempting to reconcile the ideological antithesis that shapes the way Boko Haram members view the Nigerian state and its citizenry is left unaddressed.
But then are Boko Haram members really asking for amnesty? Will amnesty bring an end to the violent campaign of the group? Is the government feigning ignorance of the fact that Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi’s faction is firmly embedded in the Islamic State structure? Is the government pretending to be unaware of the fact that al-Barnawi’s faction still maintains a steady flow of communication with the Office for Research and Studies (Maktaba al-Buhuth wa’l-Dirasat) of the Islamic State, the office responsible for preparing the religious texts studied in the Islamic State’s provinces and investigating issues of the Shari’a and replying to questions referred to it by the various provinces of the Islamic State? Is the government also unaware of the fact that al-Naba newsletter of the Islamic State still publishes the activities of al-Barnawi’s faction? Why does the government believe al-Barnawi will willingly surrender to live in “Dar al-Kufr” despite his consistent stream of audio lectures criticizing those who failed to migrate to his caliphate as exemplified in his lecture series “السكنى في دار الكفر” (Living in the land of unbelief) and “فرار المنتكسين:َ نْفيِ لْلَخَبث َوَتْطِهيٌرِ للصّف” (The Desertion of the Renegade: Rejection of the Filth and the Purification of the Ranks)? Does amnesty really have a place of accommodation in the ideological milieu of both factions of Boko Haram? And why should the Niger Delta’s experience be transferred to Boko Haram despite their seeming differences in ideological goals and composition (resource control agitation vs the struggle to establish an independent Islamic caliphate)? What about the innocent victims and families whose lives have been shattered and who have received little or no support from the government?
Prior to the inauguration of the “Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North” in April 2013, there were different attempts to engage in a dialogue process with Boko Haram and the most successful attempt was the team headed by Dr. Datti Ahmed before the blunder from Hassan Tukur sent the dialogue process to the sepulcher. Notwithstanding the attempt to dialogue with Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau has consistently rebuffed the idea of a dialogue with the government whom he considered as “ṭawāghīt” ruling with “qawānın̄ wad‘iyyah” (man-made laws) in a “Dar al-Kufr”. Shekau is not the first person to call the Nigerian state “Dar al-Kufr”. That appellation has a long stream of theological thought that dates back to the pre-colonial era in Northern Nigeria and it has not yet been sufficiently addressed even though the present generation of Muslim Northerners willingly embrace collective amnesia of the historical records on the topic.
On June 7, 2012, Abu Qaqa debunked media reports associated with Shaykh Dahiru Bauchi that he was moderating a dialogue with Boko Haram. On August 14, 2012, Abu Qaqa also debunked the claim by Abu Muhammad Abdulaziz that Boko Haram had initiated dialogue with the government. On October 1, 2012, Shekau issued his first series of rebuttal for negotiation with the government. On November 3, 2012, Shekau issued a rebuttal to the November 1, 2012, teleconference delivered by Abu Muhammad Abdulaziz during which he stated that Shekau mandated that five members of the group (himself, Abu Abbas, Ibrahim Yusuf, Sani Kontagora and Mamman Nur) liaise with General Muhammadu Buhari and a five-member committee of Borno elders (Dr. Shettima Ali Monguno, Senator Bukar Abba Ibrahim, Ambassador Gaji Galtimari, Barrister Aisha Wakil and her husband Alkali Wakil) in order to begin a dialogue with the Nigerian government in Saudi Arabia. Abu Muhammad Abdulaziz made new calls for negotiations and a ceasefire on November 26, 2012, and January 28, 2013. However, both calls were debunked by Shekau on February 20, 2013, and March 2, 2013.
On October 2, 2013, Abu Mansur al-Fulani pleaded to Shekau to accept dialogue so that Mallam Lawal, Abu Awza’i, and Hassan al-Banna can regain their freedom from prison yet Shekau rebuffed the idea. He said: “We do not know any Abu Abbas or Abdulaziz who belongs to our group. We did not delegate anyone to go to Saudi Arabia or anywhere in the world to represent us in negotiations. How can we even go towards that direction giving the fact that our aim is to establish an Islamic State that will be governed solely by the Book of Allah and the Sunna of His Messenger? Was this not our message and the goal of our preaching before our mosque was destroyed? Afterward, they massacred the Muslim umma without any restraint, and it was this persecution that spurred us to avenge and give the victory to the religion of Islam. Are we going to put aside the obligation Allah bestowed upon us because we want them to rebuild our mosque for us? We do not worship the mosque. We worship Allah alone and we uphold the Sunna of His Messenger. We do not have any business with Ali Modu Sheriff to the point where someone claimed that we demanded prosecuting him. Ali Modu Sheriff, all those individuals and others who serve in this disbelieving government, by Allah’s permission, if they fall into our hands they should immediately know they will lose their lives, except those who repent or follow Allah’s path. This is our creed and this is the path we follow.”
Shekau made his reasons for not engaging in negotiation or peace treaty clear when he said:
“There are verses where Allah encouraged the Muslims to engage in a peace treaty with Allah’s enemies, and there are also other verses where Allah forbade the Muslims to engage in a peace treaty with Allah’s enemies. These two instances are in the Qur’ān, and we know when it is appropriate to work with either of the verses in these two instances which were revealed to His Messenger. There is a verse where Allah says, after seeking refuge from the accursed Satan: ‘And if they incline to peace, incline to it too, and put your trust in Allah. He is truly the Hearer, the Knower.’ (Q8:61) On the other hand, there is another verse in which Allah says: ‘So do not weaken and call for peace, while you have the upper hand and Allah is with you. He will not stint you your actions.’ (Q47:35) These are the verses from Allah. The only time we will ever consider a peace treaty is when we have successfully established an Islamic State with a Muslim leader, and the unbelievers living under the control of the state incline towards peace and agree to live in peaceful relations with us without resenting us while we govern them with the sharī‘a. This is the only time we can engage in a peace treaty as Muslims. You can go ahead and verify that from the Book of Allah.”
But on August 23, 2014, Shekau declared an Islamic State and he proceeded to license a dialogue process for bargaining the release of his members from prison in exchange for the girls abducted by the group, a process that led to the freedom of Shuaibu Moni and other top members of the group. Since then there has been no disclaimer from Shekau about negotiations with the government even when he split from al-Barnawi and Mamman Nur. But then, there can be no meaningful negotiation or permanent peace treaty with Boko Haram until the ideological antithesis that shapes the way Boko Haram members view the Nigerian state and its citizenry is addressed and reconciled. That ideological antithesis is well documented in the first, second and third edition of Muhammad Yusuf’s book “Hādhihi ‘aqīdatunā wa-minhāj da‘watinā”. It is also well documented in the series of lectures Shekau, al-Barnawi, Man Chari, Nur, Abu Fatima, Abu Nusayba, et al delivered. Until sustainable efforts are made at this ideological reconciliation, most members of the group will forge ahead with their ideological maxim, to kill and be killed.
Mr Kassim is a PhD student at Rice University, USA. He is the author of The Boko Haram Reader: From Nigerian Preachers to the Islamic State (co-authored with Michael Nwankpa) published by Hurst Publishers (April 2018) and Oxford University Press (July 2018).
